As nuclear terrain shifts, U.S. finds uncertain footing

As nuclear terrain shifts, U.S. finds uncertain footing
Wed Mar 1, 7:17 AM ET
Imagine having lived in a house with a pretty good security system for decades - then realizing that it's outdated and ineffective. The old system still works, sort of, with a jumble of unsatisfactory, uncoordinated patches, but it's no longer reliable. Meanwhile, the neighborhood is deteriorating dangerously.

That, essentially, is the nuclear weapons picture President Bush faces as he arrives in India Wednesday, then goes on to Pakistan. A map of South Asia and the Middle East reveals a de facto nuclear arms race underway in various guises. Bush's trip and the delicate nuclear diplomacy he plans with India underscore how few "fixes" the USA and allies have; how some of them could make the problem worse; and the urgent need for more comprehensive thinking.

Three countries in the region - India, Pakistan and Israel - already have nuclear weapons. Even though everyone knows they have them, they are not "declared" nuclear powers. That means they did not sign the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which commits countries not to develop nuclear weapons and allows them, in return, to get help with civilian nuclear programs. The three are not, in other words, part of the official nuclear "club" (Britain, China, France, Russia and the USA).

And then there is Iran. It has signed the treaty but is now using its civilian program as a cover for developing nuclear weapons.

At one level, allowing Iran to develop nuclear weapons and formally admitting India, Pakistan and Israel into the nuclear club might seem reasonable. Why not? It would essentially be an Asian-Middle Eastern version of safety through Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). That theory kept the lid on the Cold War between the USA and the Soviet Union: If one country launched a nuclear attack on the other, it was assured its own annihilation. In fact, bitter rivals India and Pakistan argue that MAD has kept them from nuclear war over the disputed territory of Kashmir.

But all things are not equal, because Islamic terrorism stalks the world. For that reason, the most important 21st century question about nukes is this: How can you keep them out of the hands of nations ruled by madmen for whom MAD may prove a scant deterrent, or terrorists who are not targeted as easily as nations? Through that lens, each country stacks up in a new hierarchy of danger.

At the top, Pakistan could edge out Iran. For safety reasons, its nuclear weapons are not assembled and require layers of experts to put them together, but the weapons are under the ultimate control of the army and intelligence forces, many of which have links to al-Qaeda. Though President Pervez Musharraf is a U.S. ally in the war on terror, his country is seething with Muslim fundamentalism. He has survived at least two assassination attempts. His death could bring Islamic extremists to power. A Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, has already provided nuclear technology to Iran and other countries.

Iran sponsors terrorists and could give them nuclear weapons, or use the weapons to threaten other countries. Its new president is a religious fanatic who says Israel should be wiped off the map. One deterrent: If terrorists used nukes and Iran's sponsorship was discovered, that might invite nuclear retaliation from Israel or even the United States.

India, like Israel, is on a low "danger level" footing. It is the world's largest democracy. Its 150 million Muslims, in a Hindu-dominated population of more than 1 billion, haven't shown al-Qaeda leanings.

Given that hierarchy, a nuclear deal Bush is trying to finalize with India would seem a good proposal. Bush wants to help India with its civilian nuclear program, even though India hasn't signed the non-proliferation treaty. But India - which would have to separate its military and civilian nuclear programs, putting the civilian program under strict inspections - is balking at some provisions.

Bush shouldn't back off. That could further undermine the shaky security system that has worked until now - the non-proliferation treaty. The treaty has persuaded many nations to terminate nuclear programs and dissuaded others from seeking them.

More broadly, there is no easy, obvious answer to the non-proliferation treaty's increasing failure.

Since coming to office, Bush has adamantly - and unwisely - resisted joining attempts to update it. But perhaps that will change. In his second term, the president has retreated from the go-it-alone foreign policy that was discredited by Iraq and other failures. So far, he has wisely relied on multilateral diplomacy to defuse the Iran threat.

Whether it will succeed, however, is another question. Bush's trip highlights just how little control the major powers still have over nuclear proliferation, and how important it is not to act rashly in a world that appears to be going newly MAD.

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